We know a great deal about the clash between federal immigration and labour standards enforcement directives, but less regarding how these two processes are functioning at the local level and the role that demographic factors and civil society play. This article examines the impact of a climate of local immigration enforcement on worker legal mobilisation in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the USA. I focus on national origin discrimination and find that MSAs with a 287(g) agreement within their boundaries have lower claims rates. Conversely, claims rates are higher in MSAs where an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) agency is present. Interactive models suggest a positive dynamic of demographic insulation, whereby the negative effect of local immigration enforcement on claims-making is diminished in more heavily Latino immigrant places, and the negative impact of a larger Latino immigrant workforce is mitigated with the presence of an enforcement agency. Civil society has a positive impact on claims-making, but with no evidence that 287(g) MSAs with varying concentrations of civil society fare any better or worse. While previous research has concluded a positive impact of 501c (3) 
Introduction
The current national discussion has focused on the congressional impasse over immigration reform, though local communities continue to grapple with how to enforce the rights that are already in place for immigrants in a range of arenas, including the workplace. Yet, the goals of labour standards enforcement agencies (LSEAs) and immigration authorities have been largely at odds (Lee 2011; Griffith 2011a Griffith , 2012 . Federal employer sanctions policies, once lauded by organised labour, are now seen as a tool of labour exploitation (Fox 2009; Rosenblum 2011) , and unions today denounce them as harmful to efforts to organise immigrant workers. Beyond border militarisation and worksite enforcement programmes, this article takes into account the role of local immigration policy on worker legal mobilisation.
While scholars have examined the 'multi-layered jurisdictional patchwork' of policies that enhance federal immigration enforcement efforts (Varsanyi et al. 2012 ), a great deal of this focus has been on how everyday local policing becomes a deportation dragnet for undocumented immigrants with minor offenses (Armenta 2012) . Alternatively, this article examines the role that the climate of local immigration control may have on rights enforcement beyond the criminal justice system. I assess how the presence of a 287(g) agreement in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) is associated with worker claims-making levels, specifically in the arena of national origin discrimination. I do so in relation to two key institutional resources for legal mobilisation: the administrative capacity of LSEAs and the presence of civil society advocates. I do so while also accounting for the ethnic and economic composition of the immigrant workforce.
In the pages that follow, I begin by providing readers with an overview of the factors that drive worker legal mobilisation and the specific context of employment discrimination law. I then lay out what we already know about the chilling effect of federal immigration enforcement on efforts to protect the rights of all workers, and how LSEAs have navigated these contradictory mandates to fulfil their own mission to advance worker rights. I assess several hypotheses regarding local immigration enforcement and administrative capacity for labour standards enforcement, on worker claims-making.
My findings confirm that those MSAs with a 287(g) agreement within their boundaries have lower claims rates, while those with an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) office have higher claims rates. However, the impacts of both are mitigated in MSAs with denser Latino immigrant populations. Denser civil society networks (especially a stronger presence of labour unions) also have a positive effect. I conclude by suggesting a theoretical shift in how we conceptualise the factors that shape immigrant legal mobilisation and offer recommendations for future research.
Literature Review

Legal Mobilisation and Worker Rights
Much of what we know about the causes and effects of worker mobilisation draws from the social movement and labour union literature. Labour advocates in the USA have successfully demanded stronger protections via the courts in recent decades (Burstein 1991) ; however, there is an ongoing debate regarding whether these legal tactics dampen (Rosenberg 1991) or rejuvenate (McCann 1994) social movements. In industries with low union density, we know that worker movements are using the law in innovative ways alongside attempts at collective bargaining. For example, in the largely deregulated garment industry in Los Angeles, the anti-sweatshop movement has brought together activists and lawyers to use high-profile cases to achieve policy change with gains for individual workers (Cummings 2009 ). The needs of immigrant workers have been a central concern of these union efforts.
While private-sector union membership rates are not significantly different for native born (7.7%) and foreign-born (7.6%) workers, undocumented workers have posed a particular challenge for labour unions (Milkman 2011) . In either case, the vast majority of immigrant workers are not unionized, as is the case for native-born workers. Lacking a collective bargaining contract, these workers must leverage legal protections for individual rights enforced by administrative bureaucracies such as the EEOC. Much of the research on employment discrimination has focused on the factors driving the success of litigation strategies, and we know from this work that having legal representation and pursuing a class action case (a rarely adopted strategy) is particularly beneficial (Burstein and Monaghan 1986; Nielsen and Nelson 2005; Berrey, Hoffman, and Nielsen 2012) . However, litigation is not always successful; critics argue the judicial process 'seldom offers an authoritative resolution of whether discrimination occurred' and produces limited remedies for even successful claimants (Nielsen, Nelson, and Lancaster 2010, 177 ).
The structural limitations of the courts aside, LSEAs such as the EEOC struggle particularly to entice immigrant workers to come forward (Gordon 2007) . Protections are limited in industries that are poorly covered by existing law, such as in the informal or cash economy where it can also be difficult to definitively prove the circumstances leading to a workplace violation. Restrictions on the remedies available to undocumented workers have further institutionalised these inequalities.1 In sum, we know that the conditions of workplace abuse are worse in industries with low wage immigrant populations; however, we know less about the contextual factors that shape immigrant worker legal mobilisation.
The Chilling Effect of Local Immigration Enforcement
We know that increased immigration enforcement efforts have had a sharply negative effect on the protection of immigrant worker rights, and that Immigration Customs Enforcement campaigns have interfered with efforts to enforce federal labour protections (Lee 2011; Griffith 2011a Griffith , 2012 . Despite existing memoranda of understanding that require that immigration authorities coordinate with LSEAs to avoid disrupting ongoing investigations, in practice, this prior warning rarely happens. Advocates argue that immigration enforcement programmes have a chilling effect on workers' ability to complain against workplace violations such as wage theft, discrimination and unsafe working conditions and have made collective bargaining more challenging, despite several high-profile successes (Smith, Avendaño, and Ortega 2009) .
Worksite programmes such as Social Security-No Match letters and E-Verify have received the bulk of attention with regard to the impacts of immigration enforcement campaigns (Fox 2009; Rosenblum 2011) . A recent study of returnees at the border finds that immigrants from states that have enacted a mandatory E-Verify requirement (a programme which allows employers to screen the legal status of applicants at the point of hire) report greater fear of deportation and are less likely to move across states (Amuedo-Dorantes, Puttitanun, and Martinez-Donate 2013). Reflecting on the negative impact of programmes such as E-Verify, Massey (2013) remarks, 'the main effect of US enforcement policy today is thus to marginalise and terrify undocumented migrants while not affecting their access to public services or influencing their migratory intentions (1094).' Despite this important emphasis on worksite enforcement, less attention has been paid to the impact of community-wide policies such as 287(g) on worker claims-making. In the USA, local police were granted additional powers to carry out immigration enforcement as deputies of the federal government through the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which challenged the principles that grant the federal government ultimate authority to regulate immigration (Decker et al. 2009; Varsanyi et al. 2012; Lewis et al. 2013) . One manifestation of this devolution of power was the voluntary 287(g) programme, which can operate via either a jail or task-force model via city police, county sheriff or state law enforcement.
The jail model of the 287(g) programme allows officials to screen arrested individuals for immigration status and to issue detainers when booking them into jail on criminal charges. The task-force model allows state and local officers to screen and issue detainers out in the field during routing policing (Capps et al. 2011, 1) . Localities can adopt either or both through a 'hybrid model' (60).
In the post-9/11 era, programmes such as 287(g) were branded the 'latest manifestation of this taste for discrimination against immigrants in times of national crisis, real or perceived' (Wishnie 2004 (Wishnie , 1104 , and these programmes follow in a long history of racial profiling and selective enforcement on the part of US immigration authorities. Up to 89 counties (3% of all US counties) have applied for the 287(g) programme. These counties are on average four times bigger than non-applicant counties and tend to have larger relative foreign-born and Latino populations (Wong 2012, 747) .4 Rather than enhancing the safety and security of communities, the 287(g) programme has had a devastating effect on Latino communities, with one of the biggest concerns being racial profiling and discrimination (Lacayo 2010) . These concerns continue even as the 287(g) programme is being phased out in favour of the now mandatory Secure Communities programme.
There have been a handful of studies examining the relationship between 287(g) and worker outcomes, focusing largely on dynamics of economic competition. For example, Wong (2012) concludes that African-American and White disadvantage relative to Latinos is not significantly related to the presence of a 287(g) agreement. Parrado (2012) also concludes that 287(g) did not mitigate the negative effect of the recession on native-born workers, even in counties with strong enforcement outcomes (Dallas, Los Angeles, Riverside and Phoenix). Pham and Van (2010) similarly find little evidence that jurisdictions that have adopted anti-immigrant laws such as 287(g) are better or worse off economically than those that have not. Focusing specifically on farm-workers, Kostandini et al. (2012) provide weak evidence for wage increases in counties that have adopted 287(g) and in fact uncover declines in the years following adoption of the policy (14) (15) . In this article, I look beyond labour market outcomes to assess how a context of local immigration enforcement is related to worker claims-making in era of inadequate labour standards enforcement that leaves immigrant workers in particular unprotected (Bernhardt et al. 2008 (Bernhardt et al. , 2009 ).
Brokering Legal Mobilisation
The administrative systems that regulate individual worker rights in the USA comprise wide-and often disjointed-networks of federal, state and local offices. This paper focuses on national origin discrimination protections, regulated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which are enforced primarily by the EEOC. Pedriana and Stryker (2004) characterise the early years of the EEOC as relatively weak, lacking the 'money, personnel, bureaucratic development' needed to achieve bureaucratic goals (710).
In 1966, the EEOC had only 30 investigators nationwide (712). In contrast, I enumerated 177 federal EEOC offices and state/local Fair Employment Practice Agencies as of 2010. Despite this expanded enforcement capacity, the EEOC, like so many other LSEAs, remains under-resourced relative to the scope of its mission and tends to be located in central cities, further disadvantaging remote populations.
Enforcement agencies often have a wide-ranging jurisdiction, and the time and opportunity costs of filing claim in a far-flung agency can impact rates of legal mobilisation (Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1980) , and be particularly onerous for low-wage populations (Merry 1990 ). For undocumented immigrant populations, filing a claim directly via a government agency is not likely to be appealing (Abrego 2008) . 
Hypotheses
Given this extant research, the following hypotheses guide this empirical study regarding the relationship between the context of local immigration enforcement, the administrative capacity for labour standards enforcement, civil society density and worker mobilisation. The administrative capacity of an enforcement agency is important for driving worker claims-making, and physical proximity is an important factor for outreach and monitoring activities:
H2a: The presence of an EEOC/FEPA office in an MSA will predict higher rates of worker claims-making.
Given that Latino immigrants are often vulnerable workers who comprise the largest proportion of the low-wage and undocumented workforce, LSEAs will be particularly important in places where they comprise a larger proportion of the immigrant workforce:
H2b: The presence of an EEOC/FEPA office will positively mediate the generally negative impact of a larger Latino immigrant population on claims-making.
Government agencies alone are unable to make immigrant worker rights real, and rely often on the collaboration of institutional intermediaries for promoting worker claims-making:
H3: A denser concentration of civil society organisations will predict higher levels of national origin discrimination claims-making.
Methodology
Empirical Model
This study relies on a negative binomial regression count model applied to cross-sectional dataset of 272 completely identified MSA's, as defined by the US Census Bureau in 2010. Below I present descriptive and multivariate results.
Dependent Variable: National Origin Discrimination
The focus of this study is variation in the level of national origin claims, protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The EEOC enforces national origin discrimination protections, which include prohibitions against employment decisions based on national origin, harassment such as ethnic slurs and instances of language discrimination that are not deemed a 'bona fide occupational qualification' National-origin discrimination protections have been interpreted widely and ruled to not necessarily be coterminous with nativity or citizenship. In fact, many different types of workers may file national origin discrimination claims, including for example, an immigrant engineer, a secondgeneration Mexican-American, or an undocumented farmworker. National origin claims also are not mutually exclusive from other claims, although Best et al. (2011) conclude that such 'intersectional claims' are less likely to succeed. According to the most recent data available for this study, 10 of the 8737 claims filed in the first quarter of 2011, 2952 were also filed as cross-filed as race discrimination, 1408 as sex discrimination, 1296 as age discrimination, 903 as religious discrimination, 836 as disability discrimination and 678 as colour discrimination claims. Additionally, 3212 were registered as retaliation, and 288 as sexual harassment claims.
Arguably, other claims types capture different dimensions of workplace violations. For example, the epidemic of wage theft has garnered significant attention in recent years (Bobo 2008) , as has the fact that foreign-born Latino workers have the highest levels of occupational injuries and illnesses (American Public Health Association 2005). Yet, the data sources for these types of claims are spread across various federal and state-specific agencies and lack good national coverage.
Furthermore, while the bar to filing a discrimination claim may be higher, and perhaps a lower priority for an aggrieved worker seeking to recover wages or medical treatment for an immediate injury, I
argue that national origin discrimination claims represent exactly the type of worker claims-making that requires prolonged interaction with the administrative courts system, and which benefit significantly from legal brokers. 
Key Independent Variables
Local Immigration Enforcement
In this study, I measure the context of local immigration enforcement according to the presence of a 287(g) agreement within an MSA. As described above, 287(g) agreements were a key tool in the wake of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) used to surveil and control immigrant communities. These agreements are certainly not the only way that the federal government has extended its reach beyond the border. Other post-IIRIRA programmes include worksite programmes such as E-Verify, the Social Security No-Match Letter programme and employer audits.
Local and state governments have also adopted legislation to either facilitate immigrant integration or make life harder for undocumented residents. However, of those related specifically to local immigration enforcement, such as Arizona's controversial Senate Bill 1070 and Hazelton, Pennsylvania's restrictive housing law, many have been declared unconstitutional in whole or part, and were never implemented due to litigation. The ACS data I use come from the widely used Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA) at the Minnesota Population Center. The great utility of IPUMS data is that they harmonise data across years; however, in doing so must also account for changes over time in census geography. In order to reflect these shifts, I utilized the 'translation table' for the IPUMS variable METAREAD (which identifies MSAs using the 2000 census definitions). In alternative models, I also account for the presence of incompletely identified MSAs in the ACS by inflating population counts of foreign-born workers according to the published undercount rates. One could argue that this adjustment is erroneous, since the incompletely identified areas are not randomly distributed, and foreign-born individuals even less so. However, I argue that this bias produces a conservative estimate, given that the inflation factor is likely to over-estimate the size of the foreign-born population and in turn artificially deflate the rate of national origin discrimination claims included in these analyses. In the negative binomial regressions presented below, I limit this analysis only to those MSAs that could be completely identified in the American Community Survey (ACS) 2006-2010 five-year sample.
Findings
While the highest count of national origin discrimination claims can be found in the largest immigrant gateway metropolitan areas , when adjusted by the size of the foreign-born workforce, the claims rate reveals a markedly different distribution (see Figure 1) . When examined in a multivariate context, the presence of a 287(g) agreement does not independently predict a higher rate of national-origin claims-making. However, when allowed to vary according to the per cent of the foreign-born workforce that is Hispanic/Latino, Model 2 (Table 1) reveals that the negative impact of local immigration enforcement on worker claims-making shrinks in places where Latinos comprise a larger proportion of the immigrant workforce. That is, MSAs with 287(g) agreements tend to fare better on worker claims when they have proportionally larger Hispanic/Latino immigrant populations. Therefore, despite the potential chilling effect of local immigration enforcement for the legal mobilisation of immigrant origin workers, there seems to be an insulating effect in places where the immigrant workforce is more homogenously Latino. In general, these findings confirm Hypothesis 1a; however, the mediating effect of a larger Latino immigrant workforce contradicts the prediction laid out in Hypothesis 1b, where I surmise that the negative effect of a 287(g) agreement would be enhanced in larger Latino immigrant workforces. This could be due to two potential factors. In the first scenario, the negative impacts of police participation in immigration enforcement may be diminished given a critical mass of a particular racialised population. In the second, it may merely be that the availability of social networks to disseminate information and the cultural and linguistic resources are greater in more homogenous immigrant populations.
Local Immigration Enforcement
Seventy
Administrative Capacity for Labour Standards Enforcement
While local immigration enforcement may impede worker claims-making, the presence of a government enforcement agency is critical for propelling claimsmaking. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is enforced across the USA by a patchwork of federal and state agencies. A federal EEOC office or state/local FEPA is located in a third of the 272 MSAs in this study, and of those 91 that do, 50 have only one office. The average size of the labour force in MSAs with an EEOC/FEPA is larger (905,582 versus 176,615) , as is the proportion of the workforce that is foreign-born (15% versus 11%). The exposure variable on the negative binomial regression model accounts for this variation.
Recent claims data reveals an uneven distribution of claims processing by EEOC/ FEPA office (see Figure 3) . Take for instance the New York District, which covers 12 federal, state and local offices within its jurisdiction. This district processed the largest number of claims during the first quarter of 2011 (348 of the 1285); however, the state agencies with which it coordinates also played a very important role. Yet, not all MSAs have an office within their borders, thus creating at least two practical challenges for claimants. First, state and local agencies sometimes enforce statutes that are more generous than the federal law, and are often more accessible beyond the big central cities where federal offices tend to be located. Second, state and local agencies provide an important claims-making venue for undocumented immigrants who may be reticent to approach a federal agency that they perceive is more closely associated with federal immigration enforcement authorities. for Hypothesis 2b, which assumed an enhanced importance for these agencies in immigrant populations that were more heavily Latino. This implies that government agencies can indeed mediate low levels of claims-making amongst vulnerable immigrant populations.
Density of Civil Society
Beyond the importance of formal enforcement bureaucracies, past research has highlighted the importance of nonprofit institutional intermediaries (e.g. Fine and Gordon 2010) . However, as is the case with government enforcement agencies, civil society groups are not equally distributed across the USA (see Figure 4) . During this study period, there was an average of 99 relevant civil society organisations per MSA. These were mostly labour union organisations (71) or other 501c categories such as policy advocacy groups (85), but with fewer nonprofit 501(c)3 service organisations (14) . The distribution of these worker-oriented nonprofit organisations also varied according to whether there was an EEOC/FEPA present in the MSA. Those MSAs with an EEOC/FEPA had on average 194 nonprofit groups (29.4 per 100,000 workers), compared to 52 in MSAs without an EEOC/FEPA (34.7 per 100,000 workers.) Corroborating previous research on the importance of civil society for promoting claimsmaking, multivariate results confirm Hypothesis 3 that even when controlling for the presence of an EEOC/FEPA, the density of civil society has an independent positive impact on claims making. I also examined the interactive impact of civil society density and the presence of local immigration enforcement policies, which have been the target of persistent immigrant organising. Unsurprisingly, given that MSAs with a 287(g) agreement have larger populations, they on average also have more civil society organisations (121 versus 87 groups on average). However, when adjusting for the size of the workforce, MSAs with a 287(g) agreement within its boundaries have less dense civil societies (24.8 versus 37.4 per 100,000 workers). Model 5 reveals that while the density of civil society has a positive impact on claims-making, there is no evidence that 287(g) MSAs with varying civil society densities fare any better or worse.
Though socio-legal scholarship has emphasised the importance of legal aid clinics and the growing number of non-union worker centres, a closer look at the impact of varying types of nonprofit groups reveals that traditional labour unions may still have an important role to play in promoting individual worker claims-making. This finding may seem counterintuitive, given that at the individual level, traditional labour unions provide few if any direct services for workers beyond their membership.
As explained above, traditional labour unions represent a diminishing proportion of the workforce (7.5% of the private sector in 2013, compared to 18.5% in 1983) (Hirsch and Macpherson 2012) . As a whole, immigrant workers are even less likely to be represented by a labour union than are native-born workers (9.0% versus 12.6%), even though they comprise a larger proportion of the union workforce than they did in the past (Batalova 2011) , and there is greater parity in the private sector (Milkman 2011 
Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
The findings presented here provide evidence that local immigration enforcement may well be detrimental for immigrant worker claims-making, and that proximate administrative capacity matters for promoting worker claims-making, particularly for vulnerable workers. This suggests that Griffith (2011b) and Lee (2011) 's argument in favour of a role for standards enforcement agencies to monitor immigration enforcement would be an important step towards more fully enforcing immigrant worker rights. However, government agencies alone are not sufficient. Institutional intermediaries matter for shepherding individual claims through the formal bureaucracy. While worker centres and other policy groups may play an important role, these findings suggest that labour unions will likely continue to play a strong force for labour standards enforcement even beyond the collective bargaining contracts they provide their members.
Moving forward, future analyses should certainly investigate the role of other forms of worker claims-making. Despite its important qualities for comparative analysis, national-origin discrimination claims are a limited a proxy for low-wage immigrant worker legal mobilisation. However, several data challenges remain in making this shift. While data on wage and hour violations represent the most common type of workplace claim, existing data are very disjointed across geographic and legal jurisdiction. The now publicly available Department of Labor (DOL) WHISARD database is an important source for tracking federal wage and hour claims, but unlike the EEOC and FEPA claims, these data do not include those claims filed with state and local agencies (including the now five cities that have a local minimum wage). Similarly, health and safety claims, such as workers' compensation reports are mostly state regulated, making national analyses across diverse populations challenging.
Beyond the challenge of accurately measuring worker legal mobilisation, we might ask whether 287(g) is an adequate measure of how workers experience local immigration enforcement efforts. It is possible that 287(g) agreements do not directly affect workplace experiences. One may argue that detailed data on worksite enforcement (see Lee 2011) would better capture how individuals are experiencing immigration enforcement efforts as it relates to workplace claims.29 Yet, the unique period when 287(g) was active on a voluntary basis, on the eve of the now uniform Secure
Communities programme, provides an important empirical opportunity to measure the political will for collaborating with federal immigration enforcement efforts and the context of immigrant reception.30
As such, I would argue that worker experiences are shaped by, and in turn influence, factors far beyond their specific worksite and work hours. Policies adopted by local officials also set an important tone for employers and the broader public and should not be overlooked when assessing ways to improve immigrant worker experiences.
Lastly, while this research focuses on administrative capacity and the presence of civil society advocacy organisations in an MSA, future work should also examine the role of the for-profit legal community, which is missing from this analysis. Particularly in the case of national origin discrimination, which often requires litigation in superior court, private counsel is an important, albeit difficult to measure, resource. No matter how well intentioned the nonprofit advocacy community is, their capacity pales in comparison with the private sector. Private sector attorney, who plays an important role in public interest law (Nielsen and Albiston 2006) , will remain a key aspect of labour standards enforcement efforts that rely heavily on settlement hearings and litigation.
